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INTRODUCTION
On January 10, 2015, a revised version of the Brussels I Regulation on
international jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments
entered into force1 replacing the original regulation of 2000 (old Brussels
Regulation).2 The new regulation is also referred to as the Brussels
Regulation Recast, EEX Ibis or Ibis Brussels. By virtue of article 66, it
applies only prospectively i.e., in respect of legal proceedings instituted on
or after 10 January 2015. The Brussels I Regulation applies to all Member
* Dr. Filip De Ly is a Professor of Private International Law and Comparative Private
Law, Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam. This paper is based on
the presentation held at the Third Symposium on Salient Issues in International
Commercial Arbitration held at the American University Washington College of Law
on November 17, 2015. An earlier version was published in Dutch in Tijdschrift voor
Arbitrage 2015, 101-112.
1. Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters 2012 O.J. (L 351) (recast) 1-32 (Eur.)
[hereinafter Brussels Regulation].
2. Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 2001 O.J. (L 12) of January
16, 2001, 1-23 (Eur.) [hereinafter Old Brussels Regulation].
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States of the European Union including Denmark. 3
The amendment to the old Brussels Regulation has not yet led to an
adjustment of the Lugano Convention of 20074 (also called the Parallel
Convention) so that in relations with Norway, Switzerland and Iceland
different rules and solutions than those under the Brussels Regulation may
apply.
In this article, the Brussels Regulation is discussed and analyzed in its
relation to arbitration in view of some relevant amendments and the
questions and problems that they raise. During the negotiations on the new
regulation, it was precisely this relationship that caused many controversies
and heated debate in the arbitration community. For a better understanding
of these questions and problems, some fundamental questions also need to
be addressed as they are relevant for the discussion on the amendments
brought about by the new regulation and the identification of remaining
issues.
The basic question is, in this respect, how the exclusion of arbitration in
article 1, second paragraph under (d) of the Brussels Regulation is to be
interpreted and applied. This contribution, thus, in essence concerns the
interpretation of a single word of the Brussels Regulation. This provision
reads as follows:
"This Regulation shall not apply to:
d) arbitration
,5
The legislative history of this provision is discussed first in relation to
the earlier versions of the Brussels system as of its original manifestation in
1968. This article then discusses the case law of the Court of Justice (now
the Court of Justice of the European Union) concerning this provision. In a
3. Brussels Regulation, supra note 1, at 5. Denmark is not formally bound by the
old Brussels Regulation and the Brussels I Regulation. Denmark and the European
Union, however, concluded on October 19, 2005 an Agreement in Brussels to the effect
that the Brussels I Regulation will also apply for Denmark (O.J. L 299, November 16,
2005, 62-67). By letter dated December 20, 2012, Denmark has indicated its
commitment to be bound by the Brussels I Regulation (O.J. L 79 of March 21, 2013,
4).
4. Brussels Regulation, supra note 1, at 19; Lugano Convention of September 16,
1988 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters of November 25, 1988, O.J. (L 319), 9-48 (Providing that pursuant to entry
into force of the old Brussels Regulation, this treaty was revised to align it with the text
of the old Brussels Regulation. This led to a new Lugano Convention of October 30,
2007 O.J. (L 146) of June 10, 2009) which, as of May 1, 2011, applies to all Member
States of the European Union (including Denmark), Norway, Switzerland and Iceland.
For the explanatory report on the revised Lugano Convention of professor Pocar, see
O.J. C 319, December 23, 2009, 1 ff).
5. Brussels Regulation, supra note 1, at art. 1 (2)(d).
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third section, the negotiations on the arbitration exception at the occasion
of the recasting of the Brussels Regulation will be summarized as well as
the various proposals presented leading to the final solution of the new
regulation. Finally, this solution is analyzed and a number of problems
raised by the Regulation or unsettled by it will be discussed.
II. FROM THE 1968 BRUSSELS CONVENTION TO THE 2000 BRUSSELS
REGULATION
Article 1, second paragraph of subsection (4) of the original 1968
Brussels Convention 6 provided already simply that it did not apply with
respect to "arbitration." From this, one could infer that both the jurisdiction
and the recognition and enforcement rules of the 1968 Convention were
separate from any rules applicable in or in relation to arbitration. The
explanatory report to the 1968 Convention of an official of the Belgian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jenard, in this respect made reference to
international conventions on arbitration and to the Uniform Law of the
Council of Europe on arbitration.7 On that basis, the Jenard report drew the
conclusion that the 1968 Convention did not apply to (1) the recognition
and enforcement of arbitral awards; (2) the determination of international
jurisdiction of national courts in disputes concerning arbitration such as
setting aside procedures; and (3) the recognition of judgments of national
courts concerning disputes in relation to arbitration. 8 Outside the arbitration
context, the Jenard report stated in general terms that the exclusions as to
the application of the 1968 Convention were to be determined on the basis
of the primary object of the proceedings and the exclusions were, thus,
inapplicable if they only related to subsidiary points in the main
.proceedings or were raised only in preliminary proceedings.
Following the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom to
the European Economic Community (EEC), the new Member States also
joined the 1968 Convention which was renegotiated and amended.9
6. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters of 27 Sept. 1968, 1968, O.J. (L 299) Title 1 32-45 (Eur.)
[hereinafter Brussels Convention] (signed at Brussels on September 27, 1968).
7. Council Report of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments on Civil and Commercial Matters of 27 Sept. 1968, O.J. (L 59), 13 (Eur.)
[hereinafter Brussels Convention Report]; Convention of January 20, 1966, signed in
Strasbourg, ETS 1966, 56 (providing the uniform law was only introduced by Belgium
in 1972 and substantially modified by the recent 2013 Belgian Arbitration Act (Statute
of June 24, 2013, Official Gazette, June 28, 2013)).
8. Brussels Convention Report, supra note 7, at 13; P. Jenard, Report on the
Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters, O.J. (C 59), March 5, 1979, 13.
9. Peter Schlosser, Report on the Convention of October 9, 1978, signed in
Luxembourg, on the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United
2016
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
However, the arbitration exception was unchanged. The explanatory report
to the 1978 Accession Agreement by Professor Schlosser mentions in this
respect that in the accession negotiations, a disagreement arose between the
original 1968 Convention States and especially the United Kingdom in
connection with the interpretation of the arbitration exception: the United
Kingdom interpreted the arbitration exclusion as a complete exclusion of
whatever dispute concerning arbitration while the original 1968
Convention States read the arbitration exclusion as being limited to
disputes concerning pending or closed arbitrations or arbitrations which
were to be instituted. Notwithstanding this disagreement, it was decided not
to amend the text of the 1968 Convention because, at that time, all States
(except Ireland and Luxembourg) had become parties to the New York
Convention of June 10, 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of
arbitral awards ("New York Convention") and Ireland also was considering
ratification. On the other hand, the Schlosser report considered that the
disagreement above essentially only applied to judgments on the merits of
national courts rendered in spite of an arbitration agreement. If the British
position were accepted, such a judgment would not fall within the ambit of
the recognition and enforcement provisions of the 1968 Brussels
Convention and the court seized of a request for recognition or enforcement
of a foreign judgment would have to assess on the basis of other treaties or
its domestic law whether such a judgment might be recognized or enforced
and could have account of any arbitral award rendered in relation to the
same dispute. If, on the other hand, the continental position were followed
and the arbitration exception interpreted more restrictively and applicable
only to arbitration proceedings, this would not preclude the jurisdiction of a
court in a Brussels Convention State to rule on the validity of an arbitration
agreement as a preliminary question with respect to its international'
jurisdiction as arbitration is then not the object of the main proceedings.
From that perspective, a judgment of a national court on the merits also
dismissing a jurisdictional challenge based on an arbitration agreement
would be susceptible to recognition and enforcement on the basis of the
1968 Convention which, under the system of the 1968 Convention, would
imply that full faith and credit is to be given to that judgment (i.e., without
the courts in another Contracting State where recognition or enforcement of
the judgment is sought being able to review the jurisdiction of the courts of
the country of origin of the judgment (including the judgment's decisions
as to the arbitration agreement). 10 To this, the Schlosser report adds that in
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on jurisdiction and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters of Oct. 30, 1978, O.J. I (L
304).
10. See Peter Schlosser, Report on the Convention on the accession of the
Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
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any event - apart from the aforementioned controversy -judgments as to
jurisdiction only of the courts concerning the validity of an arbitration
agreement or judgments where the parties are ordered to terminate the
arbitration proceedings because the arbitration agreement - in its opinion -
is void, do not fall under the 1968 Convention11 as their main object is
arbitration.
In any case, under the Schlosser report, incidental proceedings before
national courts concerning arbitration such as the appointment or dismissal
of arbitrators, the determination of the place of arbitration or the extension
of deadlines for rendering an arbitral award, fall under the arbitration
exception. Similarly, the 1968 Convention does not apply to setting aside,
revocation or recognition and enforcement proceedings relating to arbitral
awards and to the English practice of an arbitration award converted into a
judgment of national courts. On the other hand, the 1968 Convention
applies to a judgment of a court in which - after setting aside or revocation
- it rules on the merits of the case.12
Finally, the Schlosser report also indicates that the 1968 Convention
does not apply to subject matters which cannot be submitted to arbitration
("arbitrability" in the sense used in most countries but not in the United
States). Such questions shall be governed by the applicable national law
and this law can also permit arbitration regarding disputes where the 1968
Convention provides for an exclusive ground of international jurisdiction
(such as certain disputes about real estate or certain corporate disputes
under Article 24 of the Brussels Regulation). 13
The question of the specific position of arbitration under the 1968
Convention arose again following the accession of Greece to the EEC and
to the 1968 Convention.14 Again, the wording of the arbitration exception
was not changed. The explanatory report of Evrigenis and Kerameus to the
Greek Accession Convention endorses - without much explanation - the
continental conception that the preliminary question as to the validity of an
arbitration agreement in proceedings on the merits in national court falls
Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of
Justice of Mar. 5, 1979, O.J. (C 59), 92-93 [hereinafter Schlosser Report]; Report on
the Convention of Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters of 5 March 1979, O.J. (L 59) 92-93 (Eur.).
11. Schlosser Report, supra note 10, at 93.
12. Id. at, 93.
13. Schlosser Report, supra note 9, at 93.
14. Luxembourg Convention of October 25, 1982 on the Accession of the Hellenic
Republic to the Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters of 31 Dec. 1982, 1982 O.J. (L 388), 1-6 (Eur.) [hereinafter
Luxembourg Convention].
2016
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under the 1968 Convention and that the arbitration exception does not
apply to a defendant raising a jurisdictional challenge based on the
existence of an arbitration agreement. 15
Also following the Spanish and Portuguese, 16 respectively, the Finnish,
Austrian and Swedish' 7 accessions to the 1968 Convention, article 1,
paragraph 2, sub (4) of the 1968 Convention was not amended either. The
explanatory report to the Accession Convention of Spain and Portugal does
not even mention the arbitration exception or its interpretation.1
8
Pursuant to the Treaty of Amsterdam of October 2, 1997,19 authorizing
federalization of private international law within the European Union, the
1968 Convention - as amended on four occasions in relation to accession
of new Member States - was transformed into a regulation i.e. the old
Brussels Regulation mentioned above. For the arbitration exception, this
had no effect except that the second paragraph of article 1 of the 1968
Convention was converted into a second section of article 1. Also, the
preamble to the old Brussels Regulation provides no clues regarding the
interpretation of the arbitration exception; recital (7) merely states in
general terms that the Regulation has a wide substantive scope of
application combined with well-defined exceptions. As indicated above,
there was already since at least 1978 controversy over the interpretation of
the arbitration exception so one might challenge whether in relation to
arbitration there was a well-defined exception.
By way of conclusion, one can say that the interpretation of the
arbitration exception - except in the Schlosser report - has received little
attention in the period between the original 1968 Convention up to and
including the implementation of its system in the old Brussels Regulation
in 2000.
15. Demetrios Evrigenis, K. D. Kerameus, Report on the accession of the Hellenic
Republic to the Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters of 24 Nov. 1986, 1986 O.J. (C 298), 10 (Eur.) [hereinafter
Kerameus Report].
16. Treaty of Donostia-San Sebastian of May 26, 1989 on the accession of the
Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic, May 26, 1989, O.J. (L 285), 1-23.
This also applies to the original Lugano Convention, which was concluded one year
earlier than the Spanish-Portuguese Accession Convention.
17. Convention on the accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of
Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden, Jan. 15, 1997, O.J. C 15/10, 1-9.
18. See generally Almeida Cruz, Desantes Real and Paul Jenard, Almeida-Desantes
Report 1990, Report on the 1968 Brussels Convention, O.J. C 189/35, 35-56 (1990).
19. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related Acts; with Protocols and
Declarations Annex; Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997, 1998 I.L.M. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of
Amsterdam].
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III. EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE REGARDING THE ARBITRATION
EXCEPTION
Also in the case law of the European Court of Justice there have been
scant decisions as to the interpretation of the arbitration exception of the
1968 Convention. Although the Court of Justice is the highest court for
European Union matters, its jurisdiction under the 1968 Convention was
not automatic in view of the fact that the 1968 Convention was not a EU
instrument and a Protocol had to be concluded to convey powers to the
Court of Justice to give interpretative rulings on the 1968 Convention at the
request of national courts in the EU Member States. This Protocol was
concluded in 1971 and entered into force in 1975.20 From 1975 until the
entry into force of the old Brussels Regulation in 2002, only two relevant
judgments were rendered.2'
In Marc Rich,22 a judgment of 1991, there was a dispute on the merits
regarding the sale of a shipment of oil which the buyer claimed was
seriously polluted whereupon the seller brought proceedings in Italy
seeking a declaration of non-liability. After the sales contract was closed,
the buyer had yet sent a telex with additional contract terms including an
23arbitration clause providing for arbitration in London. The buyer invoked
the arbitration exception before the Italian court to challenge its jurisdiction
but also immediately after summons instituted arbitration proceedings in
London where it quickly - given the refusal of the Italian seller to appoint
an arbitrator - requested an English court to proceed to the appointment of
an arbitrator. 24 The seller considered that the English court, on the basis of
the 1968 Convention, lacked jurisdiction because it had started earlier
proceedings on the merits in Italy.25 The High Court rejected the
jurisdictional defense and ruled that the 1968 Convention - having regard
20. See Luxembourg Protocol Concerning the Interpretation by the Court of
Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Civil and Commercial Judgments, June 3, 1971, 4 U.S.T. 1971 [hereinafter
Luxembourg Protocol] (concerning the interpretation of the Brussels Convention by the
Court of Justice).
21. See generally Information Pursuant to Protocol 2 Annexed to the Lugano
Convention, Court of Justice of the European Communities, (1992-2011),
www.curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/en/index.htm?63,15 (citing "[r]ecent
case-law relating to the Brussels and Lugano Conventions on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters," however, none of the
listed case law is relevant to the topic at hand under the conventions or protocols
section regarding the original Lugano Convention.).
22. Case C-190/89, Marc Rich & Co. AG v. SocietA Italiana Impianti PA, 1991
E.C.R. 1-3854. (noting conclusions of Advocate General Darmon.
23. Id. at 1-3856.
24. Id. at 1-3856-57.
25. Id. at 1-3857.
2016
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to the arbitration exception - was not applicable.26 On appeal, the Court of
Appeal referred some preliminary questions to the Court of Justice in
Luxembourg about the interpretation of the arbitration exception and some
other provisions of the 1968 Convention including the provisions
concerning lis pendens.27 The Court of Justice - taking into account the
comments of the British, German and French governments, but contrary to
the conclusions of the European Commission - concluded that the
arbitration exception could be interpreted broadly and that the 1968
Convention in any case could not be applied in respect of proceedings
before a court to appoint an arbitrator, even if a preliminary issue
concerning the existence or validity of an agreement to arbitrate was
raised. 28 The Court quoted the Jenard and Schlosser reports mentioned
above 29 as well as the New York Convention but also considered that - as
arbitration is already regulated in international treaties - the Contracting
Parties to the 1968 Convention intended to exclude arbitration in its
entirety from the scope of the 1968 Convention, including proceedings
before national courts even if these are not regulated by the New York
Convention, such as a procedure for the appointment of an arbitrator.3 °
In Marc Rich, the Court did not explicitly address the reverse question
i.e. whether the arbitration exception applies in a dispute on the merits
before a judge in a State where the defendant pursues an arbitration defense
to contest the jurisdiction of the court on the merits and the plaintiff relies
on the absence or invalidity of an arbitration agreement. 3 This was exactly
at stake in the Italian proceedings but the Court had to rule in relation to the
English proceedings to appoint an arbitrator. Advocate General Darmon in
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Case C-190/89, Marc Rich & Co. AG v. SocietA Italiana Impianti PA, 1991
E.C.R. 1-3854, 1-3859-61.
29. Almeida-Desantes Report 1990, supra note 18; Schlosser Report, supra note 9,
at 92-93. It is also striking that both Jenard and Schlosser submitted legal opinions in
the proceedings and both came to conclusions opposite to those of the Court of Justice.
The contents of these legal opinions are apparent from the abovementioned conclusion
of Advocate General Darmon. Schlosser argued in this context - contrary to what he
wrote in the Schlosser report - that the arbitration exception was to be reinterpreted to
the effect that it was limited to recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, and that
not only disputes concerning the existence or invalidity of the arbitration agreement but
also any other decision of a state court regarding arbitration was to fall within the scope
of the 1968 Convention. Jenard, on the other hand, argued that parallel proceedings
before judges in signatory states were to be avoided and that the court seized first of a
dispute concerning the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, had
jurisdiction to assess such dispute.
30. Case C-190/89, Marc Rich & Co. AG v. SocietA Italiana Impianti PA, 1991
E.C.R. 1-3854, 1-3858-64.
31. Id.at1-3858-64.
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his opinion to the Court, however, takes on this issue and concludes that
also in such a hypothetical the arbitration exception of the 1968 Convention
32applies. He concedes that this may lead to contradictory decisions if
arbitrators accept the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement and
any such award on jurisdiction is not reversed in setting aside proceedings
while a judge in another Member State might conclude to the non-
existence or the invalidity of the arbitration agreement. He considers that
this risk is just to be taken as applying a strict interpretation of the
arbitration exception is at odds with the arbitration laws of the Member
States which accept the authority of arbitrators to rule on their own
jurisdiction as well as the system of the New York Convention which is
based on the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the country of the place
of arbitration in the context of setting aside proceedings to pass a final
judgment on the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.
A second case in which the arbitration exception is briefly mentioned is
Van Uden / Deco-Line33 in which Dutch law on summary interim relief
proceedings regarding the collection of receivables and its compatibility
with the 1968 Convention was raised and only accepted by the Court of
Justice provided strict conditions are met. Pending arbitration in The
Netherlands, Van Uden brought collection interim relief proceedings before
the President of the Rotterdam District Court requesting an order against
Deco-Line for an amount of 837,919.13 German marks corresponding to
receivables under four agreements. The application was granted for an
amount of 377,625.35 German marks in view of article 1022, paragraph 2
of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure which provided that an arbitration
agreement does not prevent a party from applying for interim relief to the
court. The Court of Appeal reversed and, upon an appeal to the Dutch
Supreme Court, the latter referred some preliminary questions to the Court
of Justice, including the question of the relevance of an arbitration
agreement in the contract between the parties, of the place of arbitration
designated in the agreement and of the relevance of the pending arbitration
proceedings on the merits. The Court answered that question as meaning
that provisional measures normally do not relate to the conduct of arbitral
proceedings but to the substantive interests of the parties and, therefore, are
not covered by the arbitration exception. The preliminary questions
received a negative answer to the effect that the arbitration agreement, the
place of arbitration and the fact that arbitration proceedings were pending
32. Id. at 1-3858.
33. See Case C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line
v. Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7122(mentioning the arbitration exception briefly and including conclusions of Advocate
General G Ldger).
2016
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were irrelevant factors to the determination of the scope of the 1968
Convention and, thus, that collection interim relief proceedings in court fell
within the 1968 Convention and were not covered by the arbitration
exception.
Although the arbitration exception was extensively discussed in Mark
Rich, but could be decided on narrow grounds, it did not lead to a revision
of the text of the arbitration exception in the negotiations leading to and the
adoption of the old Brussels Regulation in 2000 despite the controversy
over its interpretation had existed since the nineteen seventies. Also Van
Uden did not have an impact on the old Brussels Regulation because it
decided only a limited point and questions about existence and validity of
the arbitration agreement did not play a role.
After a forty year period of calm, the arbitration exception regarding its
relationship to the arbitration agreement was raised to its full extent in the
West Tankers judgment of the Court of Justice of February 10, 200934 as to
whether English courts were authorized to issue an anti-suit injunction to
protect arbitration proceedings in England. Such an injunction is an order
restraining a party to bring or continue court proceedings. The legal
question was whether the old Brussels Regulation banned anti-suit
injunctions and whether the arbitration exception applied to such
injunctions.
West Tankers concerned a dispute about the collision in Syracuse, Italy
of West Tankers' ship, the Front Comor with a jetty owned by Erg Petroli
SpA, its charterer.35 The charter party contained a choice of English law
and an arbitration clause providing for arbitration in London. Allianz and
Generali who under insurance policies had paid Erg part of its damages,
then brought proceedings against West Tankers in Syracuse seeking
repayment of any sums disbursed. West Tankers then asked the High Court
in London for a declaration that the dispute with the insurers had to be
submitted to arbitration and an anti-suit injunction prohibiting insurers to
institute whatever further proceedings other than arbitration and to continue
the pending proceedings in Italy. The High Court granted the anti-suit
injunction and the House of Lords was also inclined to follow this view but
nonetheless decided to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of
Justice.
The Court of Justice first held that the object of an anti-suit injunction or
the rights such an injunction intended to protect related to arbitration and,
34. Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA and Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v. West
Tankers Inc., 2009, E.C.R. 1-663 (citing a case decided by the Grand Chamber and
including conclusions of Advocate General Kokott).
35. Id.
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thus, were excluded from the scope of the old Brussels Regulation. 36 On the
other hand, the Court stated that the effectiveness of the regulation implied
that the attainment of the objectives pursued by the regulation prevented a
court in one Member State to curtail or affect the powers of a court in
another Member State to exercise its powers under the regulation. As the
Italian court could rule on its jurisdiction under the alleged tort of West
Tankers and the arbitration clause of the charter agreement was a
preliminary question to be addressed in the Italian court's determination of
its jurisdiction under the regulation, the Court held that the Italian court
could also answer this preliminary question and that the English courts
were prohibited to interfere in that determination directly but also indirectly
by means of anti-suit injunction to litigants. The Court in this respect made
an explicit reference to the aforementioned Evrigenis/Kerameus report.
Finally, the Court observed that it considered that this solution was in
accordance with article II, paragraph 3 of the New York Convention
authorizing a domestic court to assess its jurisdiction if an arbitration
agreement is invoked before it.
37
West Tankers basically is the convergence of two earlier judgments of
the Court of Justice about the interpretation of the Brussels system which
were rendered outside an arbitration context. In Gasser, the Court held that
a (disputed) choice of forum for an Austrian court under the lis pendens
first in time rule of the 1968 Convention had to lead to a stay of the
Austrian proceedings and the continuation of parallel Italian proceedings as
the Italian court was seized first and there was no exception in the 1968
Convention to the effect that a forum selection clause had to prevail over
the general first in time rule.38 Thus, the Court refused to create an
exception to the lis pendens rule in favor of forum selection clauses feeling
bound by the text of the Convention. 39 Moreover, the Court noted that the
1968 Convention is based on the mutual trust of the Contracting States in
36. Id.
37. Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA. and Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v.
West Tankers Inc., 2009 E.C.R. (noting the ban on anti-suit injunctions to protect
arbitration raises the question whether a claimant in arbitration can institute a breach of
contract claim against the defendant or request the arbitral tribunal give declaratory
relief establishing that the defendant's action in a domestic court is a breach of the
arbitration agreement. The latter was successfully tried in the rest of the West Tankers
saga in England where the Court of Appeal converted a declaratory arbitral award into
a judgment of the court. This enabled West Tankers, on the basis of article 34,
paragraph 3 of the old Brussels Regulation, to resist the enforcement of any Italian
judgment in England West Tankers Inc./Allianz SpA and Generali Assicurazioni
Generali SpA [2012] WLR (D) 9 [2012] EWCA Civ 27).
38. See Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v. MISAT Srl, 2003 E.C.R., 1-14721,
17, 39.
39. Brussels Regulation, supra note 1, at art. 31 (Having regard to the undesirable
outcome of Gasser, article 31 of the new Brussels Regulation has overruled Gasser).
2016
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each other's legal systems and judicial institutions as reflected in a system
of mandatory rules on jurisdiction and limited review in the course of
proceedings for recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus, Gasser
stands for the principle of full faith and credit in relation to the
jurisdictional determination of the court first seized.
In its judgment in Turner, the Court held that, under the 1968
Convention, the English court could not issue an anti-suit injunction to
prohibit Turner's former employer to continue Spanish proceedings against
Turner notwithstanding that the English court had already accepted
jurisdiction in respect of Turner's prayers for relief and had ruled that the
Spanish proceedings had been initiated to pressure Turner to withdraw his
suit in England.40 To ensure the effectiveness of the 1968 Convention, the
Court did not permit English anti-suit injunctions to interfere with
jurisdictional determinations by courts in another State.
West Tankers combines both Gasser and Turner. Respect for a
contractual arrangement (forum selection in Gasser, an arbitration clause in
West Tankers) must give way to the grounds of jurisdiction of the Brussels
system and an anti-suit injunction is not consistent with full faith in
jurisdictional determinations by courts of other Member States. However,
the Court seems to have become the prisoner of its own recent case law.
Gasser is a case that falls completely within the Brussels system while
West Tankers raises the very issue whether it falls within the scope of the
Brussels system given the presence of an arbitration agreement and where
the Court pays scant attention to Mark Rich. For the same reason, West
Tankers is clearly distinguishable from Turner because also in West
Tankers the question is first to be answered whether the Brussels system
applies after all to an anti-suit injunction which aims to protect the
arbitration agreement against infringement by one party creating parallel
proceedings before a domestic court in a Member State other than the State
of the place of arbitration.
From the above, it turns out that there are three competing conceptions
regarding the relationship between arbitration and the Brussels system. The
first idea which may be called the sui generis conception and is mainly
followed in England, wishes both contractual and procedural aspects of
arbitration to be immunized from Brussels influences and, thus, to be
governed by a separate regime of national arbitration law and international
conventions. The main disadvantage of this view is that a small risk exists
of an enforcement conflict between an arbitral award, when not set aside at
the place of arbitration in a EU Member State, and a judgment of a
domestic court in another Member State which dismissed a jurisdictional
40. See generally Case C-159/02, Gregory Paul Turner v. Felix Fareed Ismail
Grovit, Harada Ltd and Changepoint SA, 2004 E.C.R., 1-3570, 1-3574.
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challenge based on an alleged agreement to arbitrate and comes to a
different conclusion than the arbitration award as to the merits of the
dispute. The second view which may be referred to as the procedural
conception restricts the interpretation of the arbitration exception to
procedural aspects. Under this second view, the enforcement conflict also
arises as it does not affect the power of arbitrators to rule on their
jurisdiction or the setting aside powers of courts in Member States at the
place of arbitration while the second view also accepts the power of courts
in Member States other than at the place of arbitration to rule on
jurisdiction and on the merits even in the presence of an alleged arbitration
agreement which can lead to a jurisdictional determination regarding this
agreement as it is only a preliminary question as to the jurisdiction of these
courts. A third view seems to be that of the recent case law of the European
Court of Justice which may be characterized as the institutional view and
where - in order to ensure the effectiveness of the Brussels system and
starting from the premise of mutual trust and non-interference in
jurisdictional determination of courts of Member States, parallel
proceedings subsist and also do not solve potential enforcement conflicts.
These three concepts, thus, do not provide an answer to the coordination
problem between parallel proceedings between arbitrators and courts at the
place of arbitration on the one hand and courts in other Member States on
the other hand as to the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement.
Moreover, the problem of such parallel proceedings is not confined to
questions of existence and validity of arbitration agreements, but they also
relate to questions as to subject-matter arbitrability (e.g., arbitration of
consumer or employment disputes) where there are different positions in
Member States and which have yet been untouched by the case law of the
Court of Justice. The question arising at this juncture is whether and how
these problems have been tackled under the new Brussels Regulation.
IV. FROM THE OLD TO THE NEW BRUSSELS REGULATION
The text of the arbitration exception remained unchanged in the Brussels
Regulation except for the fact that the article "the" in the Dutch text of the
Regulation has been dropped. This minor change in one the various
languages of the regulation does not seem to have intended any substantive
change at all: the English text of the Regulation speaks only of
"arbitration" whereas the German and French texts continue to use the
article referring respectively to "die Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit" and
"l'arbitrage". 41
The genesis of the new regulation can be divided into three stages. In a
41. Brussels Regulation, supra note 1.
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first phase, the revision of the Regulation was prepared by a report of the
German Professors Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser ("Heidelberg Report"),
which was partly based on national reports from the Member States.42
Despite the fact that the national reports did not support this, the
Heidelberg Report proposed the deletion of the arbitration exception which
would imply that all decisions of national courts relating to arbitration
would fall under the regulation.43 This proposal was in line with the legal
opinion of Schlosser mentioned above which was submitted in the Marc
Rich case. 44 This deletion would be mitigated by an exclusive jurisdiction
to be added to the regulation in favor of the courts of the place of
arbitration regarding ancillary procedures concerning arbitration
proceedings (such as an appointment of an arbitrator by the court of the
place of arbitration). Moreover, it was proposed to introduce a lis pendens
rule in favor of an action seeking a declaration on the validity of the
arbitration agreement from a court at the place of arbitration which would
suspend parallel proceedings before courts in other Member States and
have torpedo actions instituted at the latter place stayed. This last proposal
would require a claimant in arbitration to seize a court at the place of
arbitration to have parallel proceedings in another Member State stayed.
In a second phase, the EU Commission published its own report and
Green Paper.45 The Commission suggested in line with the Heidelberg
Report - to adapt the arbitration exception and grant exclusive jurisdiction
to the courts of the place of arbitration. The consultation process that
ensued was particularly controversial with many critical comments being
made about the whole exercise to change the status quo, and many
concerns being expressed about how such changes should look like. The
Commission was concerned that the controversies regarding arbitration
would provide a deal breaker for the whole revision of the Regulation and
sought support within the arbitration community by appointing a group of
46experts to review the matter and to reconsider its proposals. This led to a
42. Hess, B., Pfeiffer, T., and Schlosser, P., The Heidelberg Report on the
Application of Regulation Brussels I in 25 Member States at 105-35 (Study JLS / C4
/ 2005/03), final Sept. 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/studyapplicat
ion brussels I en.pdf. [hereinafter The Heidelberg Report].
43. See generally The Heidelberg Report, supra note 42.
44. Case C-190/89, Marc Rich & Co. AG v. SocietA Italiana Impianti PA, 1991
E.C.R. 1-3854, 1-3858-64.
45. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the
European Economic and Social Committee (2009); European Commission, Green
Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (COM
April, 21 2009).
46. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 9 (COM
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new proposal providing that the institution of an arbitration or an
arbitration related procedure before a court of the place of arbitration was
sufficient to block parallel proceedings before a court in any other Member
State provided the international jurisdiction of the court of that other
Member State was challenged on the basis of an arbitration agreement.
47
In a final stage, the European Parliament which had already earlier on
voiced its critical views, 48 seized the initiative. Also the most recent
Commission proposal continued in a number of Member States,
particularly in France and Great Britain, to face significant opposition. The
Parliament - therein followed by the Council of Ministers - took over the
lead of the revision project and reintroduced the general arbitration
exception, with no further amendments or qualifications, which found its
way into the new Regulation. However, four paragraphs were inserted in
the twelfth recital of the preamble of Brussels Regulation to address the
arbitration exception. Given its importance, it deserves to quote these in
full:
This Regulation should not apply to arbitration. Nothing in this
Regulation should prevent the courts of a Member State, when seised of
an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have entered into an
arbitration agreement, from referring the parties to arbitration, from
staying or dismissing the proceedings, or from examining whether the
arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed, in accordance with their national law.
A ruling given by a court of a Member State as to whether or not an
arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed should not be subject to the rules of recognition and
enforcement laid down in this Regulation, regardless of whether the
court decided on this as a principal issue or as an incidental question.
July 26, 2013).
47. See generally European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying
document to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commerical matters (SEC Dec. 14, 2010); European Commission, Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU)
No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in
civil and commercial matters 9 (COM July 26, 2013)..
48. See generally Brussels Regulation, supra note 1; European Parliament
resolution of 7 September 2010 on the implementation and review of Council
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters Eur. Par. Doe. (2009/2104(INA)); see also
European Parliament Legislative resolution of 20 November 2012 on the proposal for a
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast)
(P7_TA (2012) 0412).
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On the other hand, where a court of a Member State, exercising
jurisdiction under this Regulation or under national law, has determined
that an arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of
being performed, this should not preclude that court's judgment on the
substance of the matter from being recognised or, as the case may be,
enforced in accordance with this Regulation. This should be without
prejudice to the competence of the courts of the Member States to decide
on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in accordance with
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, done at New York on 10 June 1958 ('the 1958 New York
Convention'), which takes precedence over this Regulation.
This Regulation should not apply to any action or ancillary proceedings
relating to, in particular, the establishment of an arbitral tribunal, the
powers of arbitrators, the conduct of an arbitration procedure or any
other aspects of such a procedure, nor to any action or judgment
concerning the annulment, review, appeal, recognition or enforcement of
an arbitral award.
49
From the unamended retainer of the arbitration exception in article 1,
paragraph 2, sub (d) Brussels Regulation and the reasons cited in the
preamble to the regulation, one can deduce the following principles:
1. The Brussels Regulation does not apply to arbitration. This relates to
procedural aspects and ancillary claims before national courts in
relation to arbitration such as those concerning the composition of
the tribunal, the competence of arbitrators, the course of the arbitral
proceedings or any other aspect of the arbitration proceedings or
decisions on any means of recourse against arbitration awards or
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.
2. National law and international instruments - and not the Brussels
Regulation - apply to the questions of the existence, the validity and
the effectiveness of an arbitration agreement and the procedural
consequences a court in a Member State may draw therefrom.
3. National law and international instruments - and not the Brussels
Regulation - apply to the recognition and enforcement of judgments
of courts in Member States concerning the point 2. above in other
Member States.
4. The Brussels Regulation is applicable to the recognition and
enforcement of judgments of courts of a Member State in
proceedings in which such court has ruled that there is no arbitration
agreement, that it is void or voidable or that it has expired, is
unenforceable or cannot be applied. Such recognition or
enforcement is without prejudice to the jurisdiction of a court in
another Member State to recognize or enforce an arbitration award
49. Brussels Regulation, supra note 1, at 2.
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under the New York Convention. 50
These four principles are further discussed and analyzed in the next
section of this paper. From a legislative technique, it may be regretted that
the interpretation of the arbitration exception essentially is to be derived
from four paragraphs of the Regulation's preamble which confirms the
complexity of the matter and the fact that a compromise crystallized only at
a very late stage of the European legislative process.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE ARBITRATION EXCEPTION IN THE BRUSSELS
REGULATION
The first principle (the first sentence of the first paragraph and the last
paragraph of recital 12) requires scant comment and is largely codifying the
Mark Rich case law and what was stated in the Jenard and Schlosser
reports regarding procedural aspects of arbitration. The principle can
essentially be broken down into two components.
The first component refers to the supportive, complementary and
supervisory functions of the courts in relation to arbitration and reaffirms
that these fall outside the scope of the Brussels Regulation. But this does
not solve all interpretation problems. One may wonder for instance whether
the outcome of the Van Uden case is still good law because in that case an
interim collection order was sought while arbitration was pending. The
relief requested before a domestic court was complementary to an
arbitration procedure where that same relief could have been requested in
arbitration and which often is also governed by specific rules of national
arbitration law regarding arbitral interim relief. The Regulation's preamble
has not identified this problem and did not refer to interim relief or did not
include it in the list of ancillary proceedings or otherwise does not make
clear whether Van Uden after the arbitration friendly revision of the
regulation is still good law. Similarly, there is the question whether West
Tankers is not overruled by this first principle. At first sight, this is
arguable but in doing so, one should take into account that - in the absence
of an explicit position in the Brussels Regulation in respect of anti-suit
injunctions to protect arbitration or an arbitration agreement - the Court of
Justice based West Tankers on the effectiveness of the old Brussels
Regulation and not on the fact that such a ban fell under the arbitration
exception. This does not seem to have changed which implies that, in my
opinion, West Tankers is still good law.5'
50. Brussels Regulation, supra note 1, at 6.
51. Case C-536/13, 'Gazprom' OAO, 2014 Respublika, ECLI:EU:C:2015:316. To
the contrary, Advocate General Wathelet, conclusions in the Gazprom judgment
discussed below, nos 132-141; Margaret Moses, Arbitration/Litigation Interface: The
European Debate, 35 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 6, 16 (2014) (available at
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To this first component, there is a major exception which is covered by
the other three principles discussed below. This exception applies as soon
as a domestic court is seized of a question relating to the existence, validity
and effectiveness of an arbitration agreement. This exception is discussed
further below.
The second component of the first principle concerns the arbitral
proceedings. The Brussels Regulation deals with problems of distribution
of international jurisdiction between courts in different EU Member States
as well as with questions of recognition and enforcement in one Member
State of judicial decisions from other Member States. It, therefore, in no
way regulates the arbitration proceedings before the arbitrators which are
governed by national arbitration law, arbitration rules and procedural rules
agreed upon by the arbitrating parties. Despite the obviousness of this
second component, it must be mentioned here because - with regard to the
arbitration agreement - most Member States recognize the compktence-
comptence principle under which a tribunal has its own prerogative to
assess its own jurisdiction and may decide whether there is an arbitration
agreement, whether the agreement is valid and effective and whether the
dispute submitted to it falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement.
This implies that the problems listed below relating to the existence,
validity and scope of the arbitration agreement which may lead to parallel
proceedings before national courts in different Member States get a third
dimension i.e., that relating to the arbitral award of the tribunal. This
dimension is important because a positive assessment on jurisdiction by
arbitrators which is not or unsuccessfully challenged in the Member State
of the place of arbitration is recognizable under the New York Convention
in other Member States, including the Member State where a domestic
court is asked to accept jurisdiction based on an allegation that there is no
arbitration agreement, provided that such court - depending on the
applicable law - had not yet been seized of the case or had not ruled on the
jurisdictional challenge when the arbitral award was rendered. If that is not
the case, the risk of conflicting decisions arises if the outcomes concerning
the arbitration agreement are different.
It was well settled law that the Brussels Regulation did not address the
arbitral proceedings before an arbitral tribunal which was recently
confirmed by the Court of Justice in the Gazprom judgment of May 13,
2015.52 In a dispute under a shareholders' agreement in which an
http://ssm.com/abstract=2433652). For a further discussion, see also below.
52. Case C-536/13, 'Gazprom' OAO, 2014 Respublika, ECLI:EU:C:2015:316
(citing a case decided by the Grand Chamber and including conclusions of Advocate
General Wathelet. The Advocate General approached the preliminary question
differently than the Court. According to the Advocate General, the new regulation has
an interpretive nature so that it can be applied retroactively. In this respect, it must be
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arbitration clause provided for arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, where Gazprom held 37.1% of the
shares in a Lithuanian company and the Republic of Lithuania had 17.7%
of the shares, Gazprom requested the arbitral tribunal to order the Republic
of Lithuania to withdraw an earlier action brought before the Lithuanian
courts seeking an investigation regarding the affairs of the Lithuanian
company. The arbitral tribunal ruled that the action before the Lithuanian
judge partially constituted a breach of the arbitration agreement and
ordered Lithuania to withdraw or reduce certain requests in the Lithuanian
proceedings. The arbitral award was a kind of arbitral anti-suit injunction
against a party to the arbitration in Stockholm. The court in Lithuania,
however, took no notice of the award and ordered an investigation into the
affaires of the Lithuanian company which was confirmed on appeal.
Gazprom then sought the recognition of the arbitral award in Lithuania,
which was initially rejected by the court because the dispute about the
investigation into the affairs of the local company was not arbitrable, the
arbitral tribunal's award had restricted the power of the Republic of
Lithuania to take legal action and had interfered with the jurisdiction of the
Lithuanian courts to decide on their own jurisdiction and had, thus,
breached international public policy. Gazprom filed recourse against these
decisions with the Lithuanian Supreme Court whereupon the Supreme
Court asked a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice as to whether the
arbitral award could interfere with the jurisdiction of the Lithuanian courts
under the old Brussels Regulation. The Court of Justice reasoned that the
preliminary questions essentially concerned the exercise of powers by the
arbitral tribunal (i.e., to issue an arbitral anti-suit injunction) and the
recognition of such an injunction in a Member State other than that of the
place of arbitration and thus - unlike West Tankers - implied no inference
by a domestic court in the jurisdiction of a court of another Member State.
The arbitral anti-suit injunction and its recognition in Lithuania were, thus,
not only covered by the arbitration exception and excluded from the scope
of the old Brussels Regulation but also did not involve interference by the
arbitral tribunal in the jurisdiction of the Lithuanian courts affecting the
mutual trust of national courts of Member States in each other's legal
systems and judicial institutions and the effectiveness of the Brussels
Regulation as mutual trust only applies to the courts of Member States and
not to arbitral tribunals sitting within the Union. Sanctions for failure to
comply with an arbitral anti-suit injunction would therefore not be imposed
by a court of another Member State but only by the arbitral tribunal. The
recognition of the award in Lithuania is therefore for the Court not a matter
governed by the old Brussels Regulation but only by Lithuanian law and
noted that Gazprom was rendered under the old Brussels Regulation).
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the New York Convention.53
Under the new regulation, Gazprom would not have been decided
otherwise as no change as regards recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards was intended; this matter remains excluded under the arbitration
exception of the Brussels Regulation. The effectiveness of the Brussels
Regulation is also not affected because an arbitral anti-suit injunction is not
rendered by a court of a Member State. In this case, the institutional view
overlaps with the sui generis conception which were referred to above.
Gazprom, thus, confirms the widely accepted view that the Brussels system
is not relevant for the proceedings before arbitrators as long as no court in a
Member State is involved.
The second principle (the first paragraph of recital 12 with the exception
of the first sentence) states that the arbitration exception does not affect the
other jurisdiction rules of the Brussels Regulation so that a court in a
Member State other than that of the place of arbitration may be seized of a
dispute wherein an arbitration agreement is invoked by a respondent to
challenge the jurisdiction of the court. One may think of the courts of the
domicile of the defendant, the alternative ground for jurisdiction to that of
the defendant's domicile for contracts under article 7, section 1 of the
Brussels Regulation or, as in West Tankers, the alternative jurisdiction in
torts under Article 7, section 2 of the Brussels Regulation. These disputes
may relate to a positive or negative declaratory request regarding
jurisdiction of a domestic court and non-applicability of an arbitration
agreement or to obtain a final judgment on the merits in proceedings
despite an arbitration agreement. These proceedings remain possible under
the Brussels Regulation notwithstanding attempts in the Heidelberg Report
and the successive Commission proposals to limit these opportunities. They
are not contrary to the case law of the Court of Justice and are aligned to
the West Tankers case which is a second reason to assume that West
Tankers is still good law and has not been implicitly overruled by the
Brussels Regulation.54 They are the expression of the aforementioned sui
generis theory advocating that arbitration is to be untouched by the
Brussels Regulation and accepting that a court in one Member State cannot
or should not interfere with the jurisdiction of a court in another Member
State.
The result of the application of the second principle is that a court in a
53. Pursuant to the decision of the Court of Justice, the Lithuanian Supreme Court,
on October 23, 2015, recognized the arbitral award by virtue of the New York
Convention (Case 3K-7-458-701/2015, available at www.transnational-dispute-
management.com).
54. See also Simon P. Camilleri, Recital 12 of the Recast Regulation: a New Hope,
ICLQ 899, 906 2013.
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Member State other than that of the place of arbitration can render a
judgment regarding the basis of the jurisdiction of arbitrators in another
Member State and may, thus, threaten the very foundation of such
arbitration. The question is then as to the legal effects of such a judgment
for arbitration being conducted elsewhere. The answer to this question is
governed by the third and fourth principles which form the counterpart to
the second principle.
The third principle (the second paragraph of recital 12) states that the
judicial determination of a court of a Member State other than that of the
place of arbitration concerning the arbitration agreement falls outside the
scope of the recognition and enforcement section of the Brussels
Regulation. That is a remarkable principle for a mere recital in a preamble
as it means that the substantive scope of the jurisdiction title of the Brussels
Regulation (the arbitration exception does not preclude the jurisdiction of a
court in a Member State other than that of the place of arbitration) is
defined differently than the substantive scope of the enforcement title (the
arbitration exception precludes application to the enforcement of judgments
from Member States other than that of the place of arbitration concerning
the arbitration agreement).55 Nevertheless, the principle is clear: judges in
other Member States are not bound by a jurisdictional determination of a
judge in a Member State other than the State of the place of arbitration,
about the arbitration agreement. Moreover, this applies both to a judgment
on the merits or to a judgment on an incidental question such as
jurisdiction. The English text of the preamble is in this respect clear
("regardless of whether the court decided on this as a principal issue or as
an incidental question."). 56 If, for example, negative declaratory relief is
sought and obtained that there is no arbitration agreement, any such
judgment will not be recognized under the Brussels Regulation. If positive
declaratory relief is requested and obtained that the court has jurisdiction
and a challenge to the court's jurisdiction based on an arbitration agreement
is rejected, then the ruling on the arbitration defense is equally not to be
recognized. In my opinion, the third principle does not address the
substantive proceedings on the merits in which an arbitration defense is
rejected as to jurisdiction since then the fourth principle applies. The third
principle primarily looks at negative declaratory judgments about the
arbitration agreement (i.e., where the outcome is that there is no arbitration
agreement, that it is void or unenforceable, that it is not effective or that the
dispute is outside the scope of the agreement arbitration) but logic seems to
indicate that this should also apply to judgments on jurisdiction where the
55. Id. at 905.
56. See also the French text: "6 titre principal ou incident" or the German text:
"in der Hauptsache oder als Vorfrage".
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court declares that it has no jurisdiction considering the existence of an
57
arbitration agreement. Negative judgments, however, are more common
and threatening to the arbitration process while a positive verdict also
might result in a conflict with an arbitral award if the arbitral tribunal were
to rule that it does not have jurisdiction regarding all or part of the dispute.
If all these judgments fall outside the scope of the Brussels Regulation with
respect to their recognition in other Member States, there is still the
question whether they are still recognizable under other treaties or
arrangements or based on domestic law. The answer to this question is
beyond the scope of this article except to observe that the non-application
of the Brussels Regulation renders application of other recognition rules
not easier. In any event, the Brussels Regulation has in this respect not
achieved decisional harmony with respect to the interface between
arbitration and judgments in Member States other than that of the place of
arbitration.
Finally, the fourth principle (the third paragraph of recital 12) envisages
a court decision on the merits in a Member State other than that of the place
of arbitration encompassing a jurisdictional determination that there is no
arbitration agreement so that the court passes judgment on the merits. Full
faith and credit implying respect for jurisdictional determinations in sister
states at first glance seems to indicate that any judgment on the merits is to
be recognized and enforced in other Member States including incidental
decisions to the effect that there is no arbitration agreement.58 The fourth
principle solves this problem. On the one hand, judgments on the merits
57. See Court of Arnhem-Leeuwarden, November 26, 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2
013:9004 where the Court recognized a positive response from the Luxembourg court
regarding an arbitration agreement under the old Brussels Regulation and rejected
setting aside of arbitral awards rendered in The Netherlands because the Court
considered itself bound by the judgment on jurisdiction by the Luxembourg court.
58. National Navigation Co., v. Endesa Generacion SA 2009 EWCA Civ. 1397
(2010) (England and Wales); Gothaer Allegemeine Verischerung AG v. Samskip
GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2012:719. A difficult question is whether an interlocutory
judgment on jurisdiction that accepts jurisdiction in defiance of an arbitration
agreement is recognizable under the Brussels Regulation in the Member State of the
place of arbitration with possible implications for the arbitral proceedings and for any
disputes before the domestic court at such place. It seems to follow from the decision
of the Court of Justice of November 15, 2012 (Case C-456/1 1, Gothaer Allgemeine
Versicherung AG and Others / Samskip GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2012:719) that this is the
case in respect of disputes before the court. The scope of Preamble 12 of the Brussels
Regulation seems, however, to point in the opposite direction. If a judgment on the
merits must yield to the New York Convention in a third Member State and an arbitral
award on the merits prevails over a contradicting judgment on the merits (as analyzed
below), it seems to me that this must be applied by analogy to the State of the place of
arbitration (for a similar case under the old Brussels Regulation where - because of
West Tankers - the court came to the opposite conclusion, see National Navigation Co
/Endesa Generacion SA, [2010] 1 Lloyd's Rep 193, [2009] EWCA Civ 1397 (Court of
Appeal, December 17, 2009).
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from other Member States are subject to recognition and enforcement
under the Brussels Regulation as the major requirement is that they
emanate from a court of another Member State, even if jurisdiction of the
court of origin is not based on the Brussels Regulation. However, this
provides for the aforementioned risk that the judgment conflicts with an
arbitral award which is not solved by the ground for refusal of recognition
or enforcement of article 45, paragraph Ic. and d. of the Brussels
Regulation regarding conflicting judgments as this does not apply to an
arbitral award as this is not a judgment for the purposes of this article. The
fourth principle solves this by stating that the court before which the
recognition or enforcement of the judgment from another Member State is
invoked, should solve this conflict by giving priority to the New York
Convention 59 and, thus, recognize and enforce the arbitral award and refuse
the recognition and enforcement of the sister state judgment. It is
remarkable to read such a provision in a preamble but the intention and
effect are clear. Enforcement in a third Member State (not the State of the
place of arbitration or the Member State where the judgment was rendered)
will be governed by the New York Convention. Under article V, paragraph
1, sub a of the New York Convention, the court in a third Member State
can test whether there is an arbitration agreement. Regardless of the
jurisdictional determinations by the arbitral tribunal or the court of another
Member States in merits proceedings, this provision authorizes the
enforcement court in a third Member States to independently test whether
there was an arbitration agreement and to permit enforcement if it comes to
the conclusion that there is an arbitration agreement, even if a court in
another Member State in proceedings on the merits came to the opposite
conclusion. Any such enforcement decision may entail a negative
assessment of the incidental jurisdictional decision of the court of another
Member State in its proceedings on the merits. This implies that the fourth
principle in fact provides an additional ground for refusal in article 45
Brussels Regulation under which a judgment from another Member State
may be refused recognition and enforcement if it is incompatible with an
arbitral award which can be recognized and enforced under the New York
Convention. Thus, the Brussels Regulation provides an answer to the main
problem of parallel procedures i.e., the question of how to deal with
potentially contradictory decisions arising from an arbitral award which is
not set aside at the place of arbitration on the one hand and a judgment on
the merits rendered in another Member State in which the judge comes to
59. Brussels Regulation, supra note 1, at art. 73(2). (confirming that the Brussels
Regulation does not affect the application of the New York Convention. Such an
explicit reference to the New York Convention was absent from article 71 the old
Brussels Regulation).
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the conclusion that there is no arbitration agreement. 60
Apart from the lack of elegance in addressing the interface between
arbitration and the Brussels Regulation in a preamble, the solution put
forward by the European Parliament and adopted by the Regulation is to be
endorsed for a number of reasons. First, the problem of possible conflicting
judgments regarding an arbitration agreement between an arbitral award
and a judgment of a court in another Member State does not frequently
arise and there is the legislative political question whether it should have
been regulated at all. Ultimately, the Brussels Regulation comes to a lite
solution which is preferable to the complicated arrangements of the
Heidelberg Report and the Commission proposals. Unlike the Heidelberg
Report, the claimant in arbitration should seek no protection to a court at
the place of arbitration to defend itself against a torpedo action in another
Member State; it is sufficient to defend himself in that other Member State
and a judgment that there is no arbitration agreement may then not block
the enforcement of an arbitral award in another Member State under the
New York Convention. The arrangements of the preamble to the
Regulation also sufficiently protect the respondent in the arbitration who
can have a legitimate interest in challenging the jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal. If there are grounds for reasonable doubt regarding the arbitral
tribunal's jurisdiction, the Brussels Regulation still enables the respondent
in the arbitration to submit the dispute to an otherwise competent court,
although a judgment on jurisdiction does not automatically prevail in other
Member States and ultimately the setting aside judge in the State of the
place of arbitration and the enforcement court in a third State may have the
last word. The Heidelberg Report and the Commission proposals also had
another problem. They tried to find a procedural solution through a lis
pendens rule for what is essentially a contractual problem i.e., whether
there is an arbitration agreement and whether the dispute falls under this
61
agreement. In the absence of harmonization of substantive and conflict
rules governing the arbitration agreement, a procedural solution is
insufficient because it unduly restricts the powers of an otherwise
competent court in a Member State to assess under its substantive and
60. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards, art. 5, 1. Two other situations must be distinguished from the one discussed
in the main text. The first is the effects in the Member State of the place of arbitration.
The New York Convention, then, does not apply but it can be argued that the solution
of the preamble is applicable by analogy (i.e., the priority of the arbitral award). The
second situation is the effects in the Member State where the court has already ruled
that there was no arbitration agreement. In that case, the arbitral award is likely to be
refused recognition and enforcement under article V, paragraph 1, sub (1) of the New
York Convention for the same reasons as retained by the court deciding on the merits
(compare Moses, M., I.c., 14).
61. The Heidelberg Report, supra note 42.
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conflict rules whether there is an arbitration agreement. For that reason, I
have argued in a previous publication that the proposals of the Heidelberg
Report and the Commission did not go far enough and had to deal with
these substantive and conflict rules, provided one is in favor of a
federalization of arbitration law within the European Union at all.62 The
Brussels Regulation does not raise these problems as it readily accepts that
conflicting decisions might arise, provides a pragmatic answer to this
problem and does not purport to achieve decisional harmony at all costs.
Notwithstanding the positive appreciation of the solution to the interface
between arbitration and court judgments in the Brussels Regulation, still
two interpretation questions catch the eye. First, the preamble speaks
constantly about the arbitration agreement being null and void, inoperative
or incapable of being performed. The equally authentic French and Spanish
texts refer to "la convention est caduque, inoprante ou non susceptible d'
tre appliqu&" and "el convenio de arbitraj es nulo de pleno derecho,
ineficaz o inaplicable". In particular the English and French texts indicate
that the Regulation regarding the arbitration agreement and the question
whether a dispute under such an agreement may be subject to arbitration
intended to be aligned with the identical wording of article II, paragraph 3
of the New York Convention 63 so that in the interpretation of the
Regulation the New York Convention may serve as persuasive authority.
64
A second question concerns subject-matter arbitrability which is
nowhere mentioned in the Regulation and where conflicting decisions
within the European Union can occur if arbitrators and setting aside judges
in the State of the place of arbitration accept that a dispute is in full or
partially subject to arbitration (e.g., a dispute concerning an employment
contract that is subject to arbitration under Dutch law) but a court in
another Member State accepts jurisdiction under the Brussels Regulation
because the arbitration agreement covers a dispute which is not capable of
arbitration. Unfortunately, the Brussels Regulation does not settle this
question explicitly. Analogous application of the Regulation might be
considered but is not obvious because the problem has not been a topic of
62. De Ly, F., Conflict of Laws in International Arbitration - an Overview, in
Conflict of laws in international commercial arbitration, Verona Conference March 18-
20, 2010, Ferrari, F. and Kroll, S. (ed.), Munich, Sellier, 2010, 14-16, with further
references.
63. Brussels Regulation, supra note 1, The Spanish text of the preamble added the
words "de pleno derecho" which do not appear in the Spanish version of the New York
Convention.
64. See Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958,
(1981) (thesis), Rotterdam, The Hague, TMC Asser Instituut, 1981, 154-161;
UNCITRAL Guide on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), A/CN./814 (Jan. 13, 2014)
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debate in the drafting of the Regulation and the issue relating to subject-
matter arbitrability - much more than regarding the arbitration agreement -
raises important policy questions with respect to the protection of private
and public interests. Thus, it seems advisable to keep these issues entirely
outside the Regulation and leave it to the enforcement court in a third
Member State to deal with possible conflicting judgments. 65
CONCLUSION
In a clear and concise way, the Brussels Regulation has dealt with the
interface between arbitration and court judgments in Member States and
solved a problem that does not frequently arise in practice. However, this
does not apply to issues of subject-matter arbitrability. With this solution,
it allows free rein for arbitral tribunals sitting inside the European Union to
assess their jurisdiction without interference from judgments of national
courts of Member States other than that of the place of arbitration.
Moreover torpedo actions are curtailed since the New York Convention
takes precedence over the Brussels Regulation if they were to lead to
jurisdictional judgments or judgments on the merits. It seems that English
style anti-suit injunctions continue to be prohibited if they are intended to
interfere with a jurisdictional determination regarding an arbitration
agreement by a court in another Member State. The new scheme of the
Brussels Regulation is still limited to the European Union as long as the
Lugano Convention is not again aligned with the Brussels Regulation
which implies that in particular Swiss arbitrations and proceedings before
the Swiss courts are still governed by rules other than those of the Brussels
Regulation.
65. New York Convention, supra note 64. Enforcement of the arbitral award in the
State of the place of arbitration does not raise substantial arbitrability issues as the
arbitral tribunal will settle these under the control of the setting aside judge and the
Brussels Regulation is then not applicable by virtue of the arbitration exception.
Enforcement of the arbitral award in the Member State where the courts proceeded to
the merits because the dispute was not capable of being referred to arbitration may be
refused on the basis of article V, paragraph 2 sub (a) of the New York Convention.
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